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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Talon Scott Ross appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation and
executing his sentence. He contends the district court erred in finding he violated his probation
by committing the crimes of petit theft and injury to child.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ross pied guilty to robbery at the

and was sentenced to a unified term of

ten years, with three years fixed. (R., p.95; Conf. Docs., p.8.) The district court retained
jurisdiction over Mr. Ross and recommend he participate in the Correctional Alternative
Placement Program (CAPP). (R., pp.96, 99.) Mr. Ross successfully completed the CAPP
program and the district court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp. I 0512.) Over the next few years, Mr. Ross violated probation on multiple occasions, and participated
in several additional rider programs, always earning another chance at probation. (R., pp.140-44,
149-53, 202-03, 206-08, 213-15, 217-22, 242-445, 248-52, 267-70, 273-280.)
On November 15, 2019, the State filed a Report of Probation Violation alleging Mr. Ross
violated the condition of his probation which states he "shall not commit [any] violations of any
law" by committing the crimes ofpetit theft and injury to child. (R., pp.286-88.) Mr. Ross denied
violating his probation and the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. (See Tr., pp.1-114.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the State attempted to prove Mr. Ross committed both petit theft and
injury to child. Mr. Ross testified he did not commit petit theft, as he had permission to take the
two items at issue, and also testified he was found not guilty of this crime following a jury trial.
(Tr., p.97, Ls.11-15.) The district court admitted into evidence the judgment of acquittal. (Exs.,
p.1.) Mr. Ross also testified regarding the circumstances of the alleged injury to child, and his

1

counsel argued the State presented no evidence that he acted willfully in causing or permitting
his children to be placed in a dangerous situation, which is a necessary element of the offense.
(Tr., p.105, Ls.1-9.) The district court found "both allegations . . . have been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence." (Tr., p.110, Ls.8-10.)
The district court revoked Mr. Ross's probation and executed his suspended sentence.
(R., pp.309-10.) The probation violation disposition was filed on January 27, 2020, and Mr. Ross
filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 2020. (R., pp.309-14.)

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err in finding Mr. Ross violated his probation by committing the crimes of
petit theft and injury to child?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Ross Violated His Probation By Committing The
Crimes Of Petit Theft And Injury To Child

A.

Introduction
The district court found Mr. Ross violated the condition of his probation requiring him

not to "commit [any] violations of any law" by committing the crimes of petit theft and injury to
child. The district court erred. With respect to the alleged petit theft, Mr. Ross was found not
guilty following a jury trial, meaning he did not commit any violation of any law. The district
court thus erred in finding Mr. Ross violated probation by committing this crime. With respect to
the alleged injury to child, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Ross acted willfully in
causing or permitting his children to be placed in a dangerous situation, which is a necessary
element of the offense. The district court thus erred in finding he violated probation by
committing this crime.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis." State v.

Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710 (2017) (citations omitted). The appellate court first determines

whether the terms of probation have been violated. Id. The court next determines whether the
violation justifies revocation of probation. Id. "With regard to the first step, a district court may
revoke probation only upon evidence that the probationer has violated probation." Id. (quotation
marks omitted). "A court's finding that a violation has been proved will be upheld on appeal if
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
"To comply with the principles of due process, a court may revoke probation only upon evidence
that the probationer has in fact violated the terms or conditions of probation." State v. Sanchez,
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149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "This Court exercises free
review over the application and construction of statutes." State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706,
708 (2010).

C.

The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Ross Violated His Probation By Committing The
Crime Of Petit Theft Because He Was Found Not Guilty Of This Crime
As a condition of his probation, the district court ordered that Mr. Ross "commit no

violations of any law of the United States of America, or of any law of any other country, or of
any law of any state, county, city, or other political subdivision." (R., p.286.) The State alleged
Mr. Ross violated this condition by committing the crime of petit theft. (R., p.286.) At the
evidentiary hearing, the State called the owner of a vape shop, who testified that Mr. Ross took
two items from the shop without paying for them-specifically, a vaping device known as "a salt
nicotine" and "ajar ofKratom." (Tr., p.35, L.16-p.42, L.8.) The police officer who investigated
the alleged theft testified he observed Mr. Ross take these two items on a surveillance video.
(Tr., p.58, L.5 - p.59, L.6.) The officer testified Mr. Ross told him these items had been given to
him. (Tr., p.63, L.7 -p.64, L.15.) One of the employees at the shop testified she gave Mr. Ross a
vape pen from the shop in exchange for him helping her out. (Tr., p.74, L.22 - p.77, L.4.)
Another employee testified she had permission to take the Kratom, and Mr. Ross retrieved it
from the shelf for her. (Tr., p.79, L.2 -p.81, L.2.)
Mr. Ross testified consistent with the two store employees that he was given the vape pen
and had permission to take the Kratom. (Tr., p.90, L.17 - p.93, L.13, p.95, Ls.9-16.) Mr. Ross
also testified he was found not guilty of this crime following a jury trial, and the district court
admitted into evidence the judgment of acquittal. (Tr., p.97, Ls.11-15; Exs., p.1.) Defense
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counsel told the district court it "took the jury about ten minutes to think about [the case]" before
finding Mr. Ross not guilty. (Tr., p.103, Ls.20-22.)
The district court concluded Mr. Ross violated his probation by committing the crime of
petit theft, without even discussing the judgment of acquittal. (See Tr., p.112, L.11 - p.113,
L.15.) The district court found the shop owner "not to be credible, just generally" but found
Mr. Ross's explanation was "an inherently incredible claim" because he was emotional when
confronted with the charge against him. (Tr., p.113, L. 15.) The district court erred in failing to
consider the impact of the judgment of acquittal.
The district court could arguably have found the State proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Mr. Ross committed the crime of petit theft, but for the judgment of acquittal. The
fact that Mr. Ross was acquitted of petit theft means that he did not violate his probation by
"commit[ing] [a] violation[ ] of any law." (R., p.286.) This would be a different case, of course,
if Mr. Ross had pled guilty to petit theft, or been found guilty of that crime. See, e.g., State v.
Herren, 157 Idaho 722, 726-27 (2014) (finding substantial and competent evidence supported
district court's finding that defendant violated his probation by committing a new crime where he
was found guilty of committing that crime, and admitted to violating his probation by
committing that new crime). A probation violation based on Mr. Ross's commission of a new
crime could be upheld even if Mr. Ross was appealing his judgment of conviction. See State v.
Dempsey, 146 Idaho 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting "the great weight of authority permits the
revocation of probation based solely upon the probationer's subsequent criminal conviction, even
when an appeal from that conviction is pending").
But there is no authority in Idaho for the proposition that a district court can revoke
probation based on an allegation that a probationer committed a crime for which he was
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acquitted. 1 The district court erred in concluding the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Ross violated his probation by "commit[ing] [a] violation[ ] of any law,"
because he was found not guilty of petit theft, and thus did not violate the Idaho law prohibiting
petit theft.

D.

The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Ross Violated His Probation By Committing The
Crime Of Injury To Child Because The State Did Not Present Any Evidence That He
Acted Willfully In Causing Or Permitting His Children To Be Placed In A Dangerous
Situation, Which Is A Necessary Element Of The Offense
As a condition of his probation, the district court ordered that Mr. Ross "commit no

violations of any law of the United States of America, or of any law of any other country, or of
any law of any state, county, city, or other political subdivision." (R., p.286.) The State alleged
Mr. Ross violated this condition by committing the crime of injury to child. 2 (R., p.286.) The
district court erred in finding Mr. Ross violated his probation by committing this crime because
the State did not present any evidence that he acted willfully in causing or permitting his children
to be placed in a dangerous situation, which is a necessary element of the offense.
The crime of injury to child is defined by statute as follows:
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of
any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be
injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation
that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the

1

There is a lack of uniformity in how this question is resolved in other jurisdictions. Compare,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Giliam, 2020 Pa. Super. 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 3, 2020) (concluding
"no violation of probation occurred" because the defendant's violation "was based solely on
allegations of new criminal charges for which he was later acquitted") with State v. Duran, 892
A.2d 302, 307 (Conn. App. 2006) (stating probation may still be revoked "even when the
defendant is acquitted of the underlying crime leading to the probation revocation proceeding").
2
Unlike the petit theft charge, it does not appear that the State formally charged Mr. Ross with
the crime of injury to child.
7

county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one
(1) year nor more than ten (10) years.
I.C. § 18-1501(1) (emphasis added). As used in this statute, the word ''willfully" means "acting
or failing to act where a reasonable person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result
in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of the child."
I.C. § 18-1501(5).
At the evidentiary hearing, the State presented evidence that Mr. Ross' s two young
children, ages one and three, were unsupervised for a period of time at their house, and ran
across 3rd Avenue in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at approximately 11:00 a.m. (Tr., p.6, L.6 -p.7, L.9,
p.18, Ls.14-20, p.19, Ls.9-14.) The police responded to the residence where Mr. Ross lived with
his wife (the mother of the children), and another adult. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-17.) The unrelated adult
answered the door after the officer knocked for approximately four or five minutes. (Tr., p.28,
L.24 - p.29, L.2.)
The State did not present any evidence regarding which of the three adults had been
responsible for watching the children when they left the house. The officer was questioned as
follows:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Do you know who was supposed to be watching them?
I would presume their parents. Taylor and Talon.
And with regards to Mr. Ross, do you know why he wasn't
watching the children at the time?
I do not.

(Tr., p.24, Ls.18-24) The officer testified Mr. Ross told him he had been sleeping and appeared
to have just woken up. (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-11, p.30, Ls.1-5, p.33, Ls.18-21.) The officer testified he
believed the children went out the back door, and Mr. Ross "was not aware that his kids had left
the residence." (Tr., p.23, Ls.14-16, p.31, Ls.16-19.) The officer was asked whether he believed
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Mr. Ross "intended for something bad to happen to his children" or "wanted his children to leave
the house unattended," and answered, "no," to both questions. (Tr., p.34, Ls.6-11.)
Counsel for Mr. Ross argued the State did not prove Mr. Ross committed the crime of
injury to child because it did not present any evidence that Mr. Ross willfully caused or
permitted his children to be placed in danger. (Tr., p.104, L.20 -p.105, L.9.) Counsel recognized
the children were at risk because they were outside, unattended, but argued "the State has offered
no evidence that Mr. Ross knew about this or permitted it to occur, either ... or both of which is
required under the statute for a felony injury to child." (Tr., p.107, Ls.3-8.)
The district court concluded otherwise, reasoning that Mr. Ross "assumed a special duty
of care and responsibility" for his children. (Tr., p.110, Ls.18-25.) The district court erred. The
fact that Mr. Ross had a special duty of care for his children does not negate the willfulness
element of the statute. "Idaho appellate decisions have recognized that willfulness is plainly an
element of this crime." State v. Gonzales, 158 Idaho 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v.
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 758 (2004); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372-73 (2002)). The

willfulness element "requires that the person providing care or custody of the child willfully
endanger the child by subjecting the child to a known risk of harm." State v. Morales, 146 Idaho
264, 267 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). "This does not require that the defendant intended to
harm the child, but it does require that the defendant placed the child in a potentially harmful
situation with knowledge of the danger." Id. (citation omitted). It thus "encompasses more than
performing some act or omission purposefully." Gonzales, 158 Idaho at 118. "It requires, from
the standpoint of a reasonable person, knowledge of circumstances likely to result in injury or
endangerment of a child before criminal culpability attaches." Id.
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In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Ross placed his children in a
potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the danger. The fact that his children were
endangered by a lack of supervision is not enough to show Mr. Ross had knowledge of the
danger. See Gonzales, 158 Idaho at 118. The State did not present any evidence that, by taking a
nap with two other adults in the home, Mr. Ross knew he was placing his children in a
circumstance likely to endanger them. The purpose of the injury to child statute is "to punish
conduct or inaction that intentionally causes the child to suffer," not "to punish mistakes in
judgment that are reviewed in hindsight." Young, 138 Idaho at 373. While Mr. Ross may have
made a mistake in judgment when reviewed in hindsight, his behavior did not, as a matter of law,
constitute injury to child. The district court thus erred in finding he violated his probation by
committing the crime of injury to child.

E.

If This Court Concludes The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Ross Violated Probation

With Respect To Either Allegation, This Case Should Be Remanded To The District
Court For A New Disposition Hearing
The State alleged Mr. Ross violated his probation by committing the crimes of petit theft
and injury to child. (R., p.286). If this Court concludes Mr. Ross committed neither crime, then
he did not violate his probation, and this case should be remanded to the district court with
instructions to place Mr. Ross back on probation. If this Court concludes Mr. Ross committed
one, but not both of the alleged crimes, then this case should be remanded to the district court for
a new disposition hearing.
The district court has discretion to revoke probation once a probation violation has been
proven. See State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 921 (1993). But whether a probation violation
warrants revocation is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court, and this Court should allow
the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether a single violation warrants another

chance at probation or revocation. See, e.g., State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242-43 (1999)
(remanding the case back to the trial court for redetermination of the status of the defendant's
probation after setting aside one of two bases for defendant's probation violation).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ross respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order revoking
his probation and executing his sentence, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2020.
/ s/ Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
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